A reliability analysis is given for the emergency decay heat removal system of the Nuclear Ship "Mutsu" and the emergency sea water cooling system of the Nuclear Ship "Savannah" , under ten typical nuclear ship accident conditions. Basic event probabilities under these accident conditions are estimated from literature survey.
I. INTRODUCTION
Peculiar considerations for safety systems are required for the design of a nuclear ship, as compared with a nuclear power generating plant, because a nuclear ship navigates on the sea far from the land where technical support is hardly available and has a possibility to encounter marine disasters.
If some accident occurs to nuclear ship, the "scram" and "removal of decay heat" are essential to prevent a reactor accident. The nuclear ship "Savannah" has the emergency sea water cooling system for decay heat removal, of which operation is required when all other safety systems have failed.
The reliability of this system under the normal environmental condition has already been analyzed (1) . The operation of this system, however, is mainly required when some marine disaster occurs. In this situation, the system is exposed to extreme environmental conditions such as high temperature, humidity, impact, vibration, stress etc. The reliability of a system under these environmental conditions is usually different from that under the * Shinkawa , Mitaka-shi, Tokyo 181. normal condition. Therefore, it is the reliability of a safety system under various extreme environmental conditions that should be evaluated in detail.
The first major application of probabilistic and reliability analysis techniques was the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) (2) . Since the completion of the Reactor Safety Study, much work(3)(4) has been performed in the probabilistic analysis to nuclear power plants. In these studies, the effects of extreme environmental conditions were not explicitly considered. Tachikawa et al.(5) have performed the reliability analysis on marine reactor systems, but the accident conditions of nuclear ship were not taken into account to the analysis.
In the present study, the reliability of the emergency decay heat removal system of Mutsu and of the emergency sea water cooling system of Savannah is analyzed under extreme environmental conditions using fault tree analysis technique. Occurrence probabilities of basic events under extreme environmental conditions are estimated based on literature survey.
I I. FUNCTIONS AND CONFIGURATIONS OF EMERGENCY

DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM AND EMERGENCY
SEA WATER COOLING SYSTEM
Savannah has the emergency sea water cooling system and Mutsu has the emergency decay heat removal system as a safety system. The main function of these systems is to remove the decay heat from the reactor when normal power sources have failed and there are no other means to remove the decay heat(6)(7). These systems are designed to prevent excessive rise of fuel cladding temperature and possible damage of core. Figure 1 shows the main part of the emergency sea water cooling system of Savannah. Almost all the equipments of this system are located inside the containment vessel. Almost all other equipments vital to the reactor operation are also contained in this containment vessel.
This system is composed of three main loops: primary water loop, cooling water loop and make-up water loop. The make-up water loop and the containment cooling coil are not shown in Fig. 1 , because they do not relate to the main function of this system. In the primary water loop, water is taken from the primary purification system letdown line at a point upstream from the letdown cooler, and then pumped by the emergency canned pump through the emergency cooler and control valves, and back to the reactor pressure vessel.
The cooling water loop is arranged to circulate either sea water or fresh water by the emergency sea water pump, through the emergency cooler, the containment cooling coil and the cooling coil of the emergency canned pump in parallel. Sea water being used in an emergency is taken from the starboard and/or the port sea chests. All the sea water is discharged overboard through a common discharge line. The sea chests and sea water discharger are located sufficiently below the light load line of the ship.
The emergency diesel generator is located on the navigation deck which is on the upper part of the ship. An automatic control gear starts this generator when the voltage on the main buses drops below 380 V. In addition it can also be started manually from both the main console and the emergency switch board which is located in the emergency generator room. Necessary pumps and motor operated valves are also controlled by switches on this board. Figure  2 shows the emergency decay III ANALYSIS METHOD
Procedure of Analysis
In the present study, reliability analysis of the systems is performed based on the following procedure:
(1) Identify all the conceivable failure modes of the components by the failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA)(8)
(2) Determine an undesired event (top event) of the system (3) Construct a fault tree, in which the information developed in the FMEA is arranged as basic events and the critical aspect of the system behavior is pointed out 
Assumptions
Made in Analysis In this study, the following assumptions were made in order to simplify the analysis:
(1) The components in the same room are exposed to the same environmental condition;
(2) The structure of the fault tree under the accident condition is the same as the one under the normal condition, and only the occurrence probability of the basic event under accident condition differs from the one under the normal condition; (3) The decay heat can be removed by the natural circulation in the primary loop; and (4) The maintenance interval is 100 days, and at every maintenance, all the components are checked and recovered to the normal condition. The above assumptions were equally applied to the safety systems of the two ships.
Top Event
A top event of a fault tree must be clearly defined and its interpretation should not vary during the construction process of the fault tree.
In the present study the top event was defined for both systems (the emergency decay heat removal system and the emergency sea water cooling system) as follows: Failure to remove the decay heat from the reactor core within 10 h after the initiation of a demand.
After 10 h from the reactor shutdown, the decay heat decreases below 0.7% of the total thermal power, and therefore, even if all the decay heat removal systems stop at this point, the heat capacity of the water contained in the pressure vessel and the steam generators is enough to prevent reactor core damage for considerable duration of time. This time duration is useful for the repair of the system under many accident conditions. In the worst case, however, the sea water can be poured into the containment through the containment shell flooding valves as a heat sink for the decay heat. Therefore, the requirement that the operation of the emergency decay heat removal system and the emergency sea water cooling system should be guaranteed for 10 h after shutdown is sufficiently reasonable.
Accident Conditions
A nuclear ship has a possibility to encounter many accidents such as fire, explosion, collision, flooding, stranding, overthrow and so on.
In addition, some accidents produce another accidents and therefore the consequences of nuclear ship accidents are very complicated.
In the present study, typical and fundamental accidents were selected in order to treat this complicated situation. They are shown in Various kinds of collision accidents will occur to a nuclear ship. We select in the present study the one where no components of these safety systems are directly destroyed but they are affected to the same degree. The accident condition "impact" in Table 1 , corre- Table 1 Typical accidents of nuclear ship sponds to this condition. There are also various kinds of floodings, and the feature of flooding accidents depends on their causes and processes. The following is the condition selected as a flooding accident: the machine room is submerged and rooms other than the containment are partially flooded. The containment is usually more durable than other rooms, and, therefore, the components inside the containment are assumed to be at the normal condition in this flooding accident.
IV . FAILURE DATA
The component failure rate under the normal condition is deduced from WASH-1400, Appendix III "Failure Data"(10), in which comprehensive failure data have been assessed for the components of nuclear power plants. The log-normal distribution has been used to describe the data variability. The median value of the distribution has been given and the assessed 90% range has been expressed by the error factor. Failure rates under the extreme environmental conditions are required to calculate the system failure probabilities under accident conditions. The WASH-1400 has given failure data under extreme conditions for pump and motor as shown in Table 3 . It can be seen that 10~100 times greater values have been given to the failure rates at extreme condition as compared with the values under the normal condition. Tables  4 and 5 . "K1", "K2" and "K3" in Table 5 , are multiplying factors which deduce the failure rate under any particular condition from the failure rate under normal condition; the "Rating" to a component, and the value of 100 corresponds to the rated load; the "temperature" Table 4 Failure rates under extreme conditions (Green & Bourne) means the environmental temperature to which a component is exposed.
The failure rates of a factor to two orders of magnitude greater than those under the normal condition have been given in these tables.
In WASH-1400 (12) , the probability of pipe rupture caused by a pump flywheel fracture accident has been estimated with some assumptions. The estimated value is 1.3X10-2. In the present study, this value is taken into consideration for the estimation of the pipe rupture probability at explosion accidents. Table 6 (a),(b) summarize the failure probability of each component under the specified accident conditions, where the mark "*" means that the failure probability is equal to the one under the normal condition.
V.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS Figure 3 (a),(b) show the reduced fault trees of the emergency decay heat removal system and the emergency sea water cooling system, respectively. The basic events are explained in Table 2 . In Fig. 3(b) , events concerning the flow system in the machine room do not appear since the contribution of them to the top event is small as compared with those of other branches.
The calculated distributions of occurrence probability of top event under the normal condition are shown in Fig. 4(a),(b) . The distributions are almost same each other. The median, upper bound and lower bound of them were 7.7X10-2, 3.5X10-1 and 2.9X10-2 for Mutsu, and 8.3X10-2, 3.3X10-1 and 3.3X10-2 for Savannah, respectively. Table 5 Multiplying factors to failure rate (Green & Bourne) Fig. 3(a 
),(b)
Reduced fault tree for emergency decay heat removal system
The median value for Mutsu is a little smaller than that for Savannah. This is due to the redundancy of the heat exchanger portion of the emergency decay heat removal system. In the emergency generator room of Mutsu, there are five sensitive components (emergency generator, two switches, breaker and electric circuit) which have large failure probabilities under the condition "explosion". On the other hand, there are nine sensitive components (emergency generator, switch, six breakers, electric circuit) in the emergency generator room of Savannah.
The difference between the number of these sensitive components produces the difference of the top event probabilities between Mutsu and Savannah, in the case of "explosion in emergency generator room". The same thing is also seen for the accident "fire in emergency generator room".
In the case of "impact", all the components are affected by the impact force. Therefore, the dispersive arrangement cannot change the system reliability. The probabilities of top event under the condition "impact" are close each other for Mutsu and Savannah.
Under the condition "flooding", Savannah has the smaller probability of top event than Mutsu. This is due to the fact that, for Savannah, most components are inside the containment and this system is well protected from this flooding accident.
From the above results, it is seen that the reliability of these systems is influenced by extreme environmental conditions. The operation of safety system of a nuclear ship is considered to be mainly required when some accident occurs. Therefore, for the evaluation of the effectiveness of safety system of a nuclear ship, it is necessary to calculate its failure probabilities not only under the normal condition but also under accident conditions.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The reliability of the emergency decay heat removal system of the nuclear ship "Mutsu" and that of the emergency sea water cooling system of the nuclear ship "Savannah" are almost the same under the normal condition.
The dispersive arrangement is useful to prevent the reduction of the system reliability under the condition of an accident in one room.
The system reliability is mainly determined by the reliability of the components which have large failure probabilities.
From the comparison between the reliability of these two systems under many accident conditions, it is seen that the reliability of a system is determined by the configuration and the environmental condition of a system as well as the maintenance interval, the test interval, the repair time etc.
For the evaluation of the effectiveness of safety system of a nuclear ship, it is necessary to evaluate its reliability under various accident conditions. R EFERENCES
